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Who Wants Enlargement of the EU?
Support for Enlargement among Elites and Citizens 
in the European Union
SYLKE NISSEN*
University of Leipzig, Germany
Abstract: A collective European identity is often mentioned as important for the
European Union’s future. The article discusses common definitions of collective
identity and proposes to add a utilitarian component to the concept. In this re-
spect, political solidarity and, particularly, interest in and support for the com-
ing Eastern enlargement are taken as an indicator of European identity. As a
starting point for further discussion on the structure and necessity of European
identity, the article examines enlargement support among political actors and
citizens in EU countries and demonstrates that support for enlargement is dis-
tributed differently on these levels. It is argued that EU elite politics does little to
promote the development of a collective European identity and might even get
the European integration process into some difficulty.
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European identity and Eastern enlargement
The current discussion on the future of Europe frequently mentions a European
identity as a decisive prerequisite for the successful development of Project Europe.
“The process of European integration proceeds while the common market is ex-
tended and political decision-making authority is transferred to the European level
at an accelerating pace. More and more this process needs the integration of the cit-
izens and a change of their identity towards Europe. ... Without this change of iden-
tity the European project is in danger of failure because of the lack of people’s will
for co-operation” [Münch 1999: 223, my translation]. The empirical basis for these
kinds of normative demands remains unexamined.
On the other hand, a number of contributions to the debate state that a col-
lective European identity already partially exists. But hints as to the grounds for this
identity and its sustainability are usually missing. The European Commission, for
instance, has surveys conducted twice a year in all member states of the EU. These
polls include a question on whether the citizens see themselves as Europeans only,
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or solely as members of their particular nation, or as both Europeans and French,
Europeans and Britons, Europeans and Greeks, etc., at the same time. The Commis-
sion’s Standard Eurobarometer takes the answers to this question, without any fur-
ther analysis, as an expression of ‘European and national identity’ [European Com-
mission 2002a: 60]. It does not say whether such a European identity consists of
more than the answer to a simple question.
I intend here to consider the meaning of European identity underlying these
varying standpoints and then take a closer look at the chances of a European iden-
tity being a real basis for Europe’s further political development. 
In my attempt to give an idea of what European identity is, I am following the
concepts of collective identity that speak of a subject of identification, an object of
identification, and a particular relationship between a subject and an object [Ger-
hards 2003]. In the discussion of the subject of identity I refer to the population of
the 15 member states of the European Union. The object of identification is the
European Union itself, and the relationship between subject and object consists in
the people’s feelings towards the European Union. It should be clear that any con-
cept of collective identity is surely not to be understood as the physical identity of
Europeans with the European Union, but rather as the cognitive identification of
Europeans with the European Union. The first definition of European identity thus
means a sense of closeness that unites European citizens with their spatial sur-
roundings – here, the Europe of 15 member states. 
However weak or strong this feeling may be, it cannot be taken as sufficient re-
assurance for political action as long as it is tied only to emotion. Feelings are sub-
ject to fluctuations and sometimes follow irrational developments. With respect to a
historically young object of identification like the European Union, which is devel-
oping now alongside existing objects of identification (like the nation or a region), it
is not possible to imply a distinctive emotional relationship. Especially during the
current process of European integration, which is said to be in need of a European
identity for its success, expressions of feelings or opinions are not enough to back
and secure integration policies. The claim for European identity must apply to reli-
able and in a certain sense calculable support for the political process. European
identity becomes more binding when the individual’s relationship with Europe is
connected with fulfilled – or disappointed – interests. Fulfilled expectations and in-
terests support the growth of a sustainable identification with Europe, which can
serve as a sound basis for the further development of the European project.
I should therefore complete the above-mentioned definition of collective iden-
tity towards Europe: If European identity is not to remain merely lip-service but is
to be supportive to the European integration process, then the constitution of a
European identity not only needs an emotional aspect but must also be completed
with a utilitarian component. This means the European Union must become inten-
sively and permanently tied to the interests of citizens. This link can result from the
perception of the advantages people see in European Union membership. Or, it can
be expressed through a willingness to support others in an attitude of solidarity. 
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In this respect, for this study I am looking at the support for the further de-
velopment of Europe. Consequently, support here means not only verbal approval
but also transnational solidarity, i.e. support even if engagement in favour of the
community of Europeans is not to be free of charge.1 The coming Eastern enlarge-
ment of the European Union sets a good opportunity to test the inherent sustain-
ability of the support for Europe. Enlarging the Union by ten or twelve states will
put some burden – at least a short-term one – on today’s member states [Weise et
al. 2001; Wernicke 2001]. If EU-Europeans support enlargement in spite of the ex-
pected costs, in terms of financial burdens, migration or labour-market problems,
I will judge this as an indicator in favour of the development of a sustainable com-
munity of Europeans. As Georg Vobruba puts it: “Collective identities stand the
practical test if they lead to acceptance of demands for redistribution” [Vobruba
2001: 127; my translation]. Thus the question is not only, in the words of Jürgen
Habermas, whether “Swedes and Portuguese are willing to vouch for each other”
[Habermas 2001: 101; my translation], but whether the solidarity of EU citizens
would make Swedes and Portuguese vouch for Poles and Czechs, too.
My notion of European identity will not of course render the rather normative
debate obsolete, but it will help to advance the discussion by adding the utilitarian
aspect. I will begin the examination with an investigation of the support for en-
largement of the European Union on two levels: on the level of political elites and
on the level of citizens.
The stance the EU governments are taking towards enlargement
How are EU governments behaving in the run-up to enlargement? I shall present
some contributions to the enlargement discussion and some of the strategies of po-
litical elites. As the following discussion will show, the positions I present here are
typical ones. Therefore, I am not aiming at a complete documentation of all mem-
ber countries, but rather concentrate on a few examples. I will start with the German
position: the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, emphasises that the EU
will not integrate petitioners but a “booming region, the dynamics of which all pre-
sent members will profit from” [Fischer n.d.: 2; my translation]. In his view,
Germany has a vital interest in realising the enlargement as quickly as possible be-
cause of the political and economic prospects [ibid.]. The German Ministry for Eco-
nomic Affairs is also convinced that in the long run Germany will enjoy economic
advantages from enlargement. “The enlargement puts Germany – and especially the
new Bundesländer – more into the centre of the European Union. The enlargement
will offer the German economy great prospects” [Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft
und Technologie: 2002; my translation].
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1 It should be kept in mind that solidarity is not only an expression of feelings towards other
humans, it also has a strong component of the pursuit of an interest [Nissen 1999].
Similar statements are made in Austria. The President of the Austrian Republic,
Thomas Klestil, points explicitly to the advantages of enlargement for the Austrian
economy and the country’s security policy: “Since the opening of the East in 1989
Austria in particular gained enormously from economic relations with Central and
Eastern European countries. Leading these countries up to the EU puts Austria from
the so far geographically marginalised position back to the centre of a unified Europe
again” [Klestil 2002; my translation]. The same interpretation can be found in the
documents of the ÖVP, the Austrian conservative party and the party of Chancellor
Wolfgang Schüssel: “We Austrians in particular will, like the Germans, gain most
from enlargement. The development of our trade balance, and the increases in export
since the opening of the East clearly show this” [Stenzel 2002: 5; my translation].
The British government has mainly aimed at codifying the new political order
that has emerged on the European continent since the fall of the Iron Curtain. Tony
Blair demonstrated this, for example, in his speech on Europe’s political future pre-
sented at the stock exchange in Warsaw: “Without enlargement, Western Europe
will always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict and mass migration on its
borders” [Blair 2000].
Blair’s former FCO Minister for Europe, Peter Hain, additionally stressed that
“our support for enlargement is not only based on our desire to reunite Europe af-
ter the divisions of the Cold War. It also derives from a hardheaded assessment of
the benefits that enlargement will bring for the UK” [Hain 2001].
Contrary to these widely affirmative positions, French European politics seem
to be guided mainly by a fear of the revitalisation of German predominance. At least
this concern was expressed during the French presidency, when France was able to
prevent Germany’s revaluation in the European Council [Neunreither 2001: 190]. At
the end of 2001, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hubert Vedrine, tried to re-
duce the pace of the enlargement process by proposing to accept the applications
from Romania and Bulgaria in the first enlargement round, too. This would clearly
have postponed accession for all [Oldag 2001a]. In the same manner France pro-
tracted financial revisions and hindered reform efforts concerning the common
agricultural policy. The required agreement between Germany and France could on-
ly be reached in October 2002, leaving less than two months to go before the EU had
wanted to come to a final agreement with the candidate countries in the negotia-
tions on the development of agricultural policy.
The governments of Southern European member states share the French po-
sition and worry about a realignment of power in the enlarged European Union.
Those fears are especially strong in Spain and Portugal, but also in Italy. They are
expressed in the demand for greater emphasis on Mediterranean politics and for
non-impairment of vested rights [Weise et al. 2001: 130]. Former Italian Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Lamberto Dini, pointed to the particular role of the EU members in
the South: “It is up to Italy, more than any other country, to bring the Mediterranean
back to the centre of Europe, to make it understood that no Europe would be com-
plete not only without the East but also without the South” [Dini 2000]. Today, the
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Italian attitude does not seem to have become any more liberal with Silvio Berlus-
coni in power.
Spain’s Prime Minister José Maria Aznar is leading the Southern European
countries in their negotiations on the protection of acquired possessions. During re-
cent years he has concentrated on securing the subsidies Spain receives from EU
funds. His commitment to Spanish interests became particularly evident when
Aznar was able to change the EU’s budgeting to the benefit of his country during
protracted meetings in Berlin in 1999. One year later, in Nice, he successfully bar-
gained for Spain’s share of votes in the European Council. In April 2001, he rocked
the boat by hinting at the so-called statistical effect. Leaving all criteria for the dis-
tribution of subsidies unchanged after the accession of poorer countries would
make Spain arithmetically ‘richer’ compared to the EU average and thus less enti-
tled to receiving money from the structural and cohesion funds: “Spain thinks it is
necessary to find a solution to this problem during the accession talks” [Aznar
2001]. At the same time, Spain‘s Prime Minister – partly assisted by the representa-
tives of Greece, Portugal and Italy – blocked an agreement on freedom of movement
for the labour force, which made the other member states accuse him of blackmail:
“Madrid‘s claims resemble a package deal between enlargement and continued pay-
ment of subsidies” [Oldag 2001b; my translation].
Greece and Portugal, with varying intensity, have joined Spain in its strategy
of protecting acquired possessions, but also follow their own paths. The Greek gov-
ernment supports enlargement, especially because of the accession of Cyprus, and
it ties its vote to the consideration of Greek-Cyprian interests. With respect to the
future distribution of funds, Greece doesn’t have much to fear, as the country is
even poorer than some of the candidate countries. Prime Minister Kostas Simitis
stressed that Greece’s “central minimum goals will always be: to ensure the equal
participation of the country in the EU institutional system that will emerge and in
particular in the inner core of the Union” and “to guarantee the necessary redistrib-
utive policies for cohesion and solidarity as well as the budget needed for the im-
plementation of the policies. It is a matter of central importance that the social di-
mension of the Union be enhanced, that the European social model be reinforced
and inter-regional and social inequalities be combated” [Simitis 2001: 11].
Former Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres offered an interesting point of
view. In contrast to the political rationality that is usually shown, he pushed mate-
rialistic and short-sighted calculations into the background, while arguing in favour
of enlargement. “We need a stable Europe that includes the East European coun-
tries. This is more important than EU funds for Portugal. I’d like to put it this way:
It is in our own best – if you like: egoistic – interest to have a long-term stable
Europe. This means we put short-term egoistic goals aside” [Guterres 1999; my trans-
lation]. In view of the country’s economic problems, the Portuguese did not seem
willing to follow Guterres’ idea of postponing a rational short-term pursuit of inter-
ests in favour of national long-term interests. His Socialist Party lost the local elec-
tions in December 2001 in all major cities and Guterres resigned.
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I will leave this point with the above examples alluding to the national positions.
Adding more quotes from more countries would not increase the amount of insight
into the distribution of interests on the political level. It is not my intention to give a
full overview of the positions on enlargement taken by the elites, but rather to demon-
strate the basic North-South distinction regarding support for enlargement that di-
vides the European Union in its present-day profile [Weise et al. 2001: 131]. Basically
all members state themselves to be in favour of enlargement. But underneath this con-
sensus, the Southern European countries receiving subsidies fear that in the course of
enlargement the redistribution of funds from West to East will in fact be a redistribu-
tion from South to East. The Southern European countries expect they will have to
stand aside for the benefit of the new recipients in the East [Vobruba 2003: 41].
Citizens’ opinions on European enlargement
What do people in Europe think about enlargement? Do citizens, like politicians,
support enlargement in principle but differ in detail? The answer is yes, but in a way
other than expected.
Twice a year the European Commission publishes the Standard Eurobarometer,
which contains the main results of public opinion surveys carried out in all member
countries. Although some of the East European countries applied for membership as
early as 1994,2 people in the EU were for the first time explicitly asked for a statement
on enlargement in autumn 2000. In that survey – Eurobarometer 54 – an average of
44% of the respondents were in favour of enlargement and 35% voted against it. By
spring 2002 (Eurobarometer 57) the support for enlargement had increased to 50%,
while 30% were against it and 20% did not have an opinion (figure 1).3
These averages hide the substantial variations among the national results. Fig-
ures 2 to 5 show the distribution of advocates and sceptics in each member country
over time.
Between autumn 2000 and autumn 2001, the highest approval of enlargement
is expressed in Greece (figures 2 to 4). Only in spring 2002 were the Greeks sur-
passed by the Danish (figure 5). After Greece and Denmark, support is highest in
Spain, Italy and Portugal, and also in Sweden and Ireland. In autumn 2001, approval
rates shot up in all member states. In Greece the figure for those in favour of en-
largement even reached 75%.4 At the lower end of the scale there is a group of coun-
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2 Malta and Cyprus even applied for membership in 1990.
3 Standard Eurobarometer 58 (autumn 2002) does not deal with enlargement issues but refers
to the Flash Eurobarometer 132/2 on enlargement, released in December 2002. The latter of
course has many questions on enlargement, but none that would contribute to elaborating
figure 1. See note 3.
4 The European Commission itself assumed that a change in the question might have influ-
enced the answers but has not given any further explanation about this question so far. With
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Figure 1. Support for Enlargement
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Figure 2. Enlargement – for or against? (autumn 2000)
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Figure 3. Enlargement – for or against? (autumn 2000)
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Figure 4. Enlargement – for or against? (autumn 2001)
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tries that is also stable through all four waves. Germany, France, Austria and the
United Kingdom bring up the rear with the smallest share of advocates. The survey
results from autumn 2000 and spring 2001 show that in each of these countries the
proportion of those against enlargement was bigger than the proportion of those in
favour of it (figures 2 and 3). This heavy scepticism has weakened since, and only in
France do more people still reject enlargement than approve it (figure 5).
If we compare people’s opinions with the statements of the political elites
we can see a discrepancy that might have consequences for the political future of
the European Union. In most of the current member states people do not share the
interpretations given by their governments. The only exceptions are France and
Greece – each for known historical and political reasons. In most of the other
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the purpose of gathering information on the public opinion of enlargement, Standard Euro-
barometer 54 and 55 asked the question: ‘What is your opinion on the following statement?
Please tell me whether you are for it or against it: The European Union should be enlarged and
include new countries’ [European Commission 2000]. The phrasing of this particular question
has been slightly changed in Eurobarometer 56: ‘... the enlargement of the European Union to in-
clude new countries’ [European Commission 2002a]. These questions could be answered with
‘for’, ‘against’ and ‘don’t know’. Question 2 of the latest Flash Eurobarometer 132/2 asks,
‘Are you, personally, totally in favour, rather in favour, rather opposed or totally opposed to
the enlargement of the European Union?’ [European Commission 2002b], and allows for the
categories ‘totally in favour’, ‘rather in favour’, ‘rather opposed’, ‘totally opposed’, ‘it depends
on the country/countries’, ‘don’t know/no answer’. Obviously this question again breaks
with the pattern and makes comparability with previous samples impossible.
Figure 5. Enlargement – for or against? (spring 2002)
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EU countries it is necessary to note that the interpretations of citizens and elites dif-
fer.5 The table above presents a starting point for further discussion in summarising
the possible constellations of citizens’ and elites’ opinions in four typical cases (fig-
ure 6). 
According to the information in the Eurobarometer, it may be assumed that
not only the political actors but also EU citizens know that enlargement will not
be without its costs. Interestingly, it is particularly the people in the Southern
European countries, who are highly in favour of enlargement, who also prove to be
remarkably aware of the costs. The same survey in autumn 2000 that showed 70%
of Greek citizens supporting enlargement also indicated that the same share of re-
spondents expressed fears over job relocations, while 79% were afraid of disadvan-
tages for farmers, and more than half of the Greek population said enlargement
would become too expensive. Even so, two-thirds of the Spanish population and
three-quarters of the Portuguese feared the onset of problems for agriculture. In
both countries, more than 60% of respondents expect that the amount of EU subsi-
dies will decrease [European Commission 2000]. In Flash Eurobarometer 132/2, not
only the sceptics like Germans and Austrians, but also – and even more strongly –
the major advocates like the Spanish and the Portuguese featured the highest (and
a generally increasing) ratio of respondents that believe enlargement will lead to a
rise in unemployment [European Commission 2002b]. This means that the knowl-
edge of problems that might arise with enlargement does not necessarily lead re-
spondents to reject the accession of East European countries to the European
Union.
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5 In a different but related context the Swedes recently gave proof of the differing percep-
tions when the refendum on the Euro failed in September 2003.
Figure 6. Exemplary positions towards enlargement
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The problematic distributions of advocates and sceptics
I have characterised the visible readiness that exists to accept redistribution to one’s
own debit in order to promote the European project as an indicator of the develop-
ment of a sustainable European identity. In this respect, the data on cost-con-
sciousness in countries like Greece or Spain could lead us to think that there is a
growing collective identity of Europeans. Perhaps this observation is correct. But,
on the other hand, only half of all EU citizens show some readiness to invest in en-
largement, and in four countries the number of those who are sceptical towards or
undecided about enlargement still exceeds the number of advocates, which means
that we can hardly speak of a sustainable collective identity. In this heterogeneous
atmosphere, with a widespread proportion of sceptics, politicians cannot rely on
support for enlargement.
This deficiency could get the enlargement process into trouble, as the political
elites and institutions need the support of the population in order to successfully
bring off the accessions. According to the Amsterdam Treaty on the European
Union, the decision to enlarge the EU has to be ratified by every single member
state: “The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which
the Union is founded which such admission entails shall be the subject of an agree-
ment between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be
submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their re-
spective constitutional requirements” [European Commission n.d.]. Constitutional
requirements can mean that member countries ratify important European decisions
concerning enlargement through national referenda. This holds true not only for the
accession treaties but also for the European Constitution presented by the EU con-
vent, which will replace all previous agreements. The Danish Constitution, for ex-
ample, requires a referendum whenever national sovereignty is transferred to
transnational authorities, as does the Irish Constitution with respect to internation-
al agreements. According to the EU Directorate General for Enlargement, at present
no member state plans to hold a referendum on the accession treaties. But in 13 out
of 15 member states national referenda are constitutionally possible, and in 9 coun-
tries the outcome of a referendum is binding [Stoiber and Thurner 2000]. In most of
the countries, the holding of a referendum depends on the initiative of institutional
actors. Consequently, governments or parliaments can prevent a plebiscite. Still, it
is not out of the question that a particular public-political climate could render it
necessary to sanction the accession treaties through a national referendum in one
member country or the other. If in this case the people did not share the opinion of
the elites the process of Eastern enlargement could be interrupted.6
In order to avoid such a threat, political actors on the EU level and in member
countries could try to make strategic use of those results from the Eurobarometer
Sylke Nissen: Who Wants Enlargement of the EU?
767
6 The same holds true, of course, for all referenda to be held in the candidate countries. But
the impact of these referenda is not the issue here.
surveys that indicate a positive attitude towards enlargement and could try to raise
general attention for the numerous enlargement advocates. But, in fact, the im-
pressing data from Greece, Spain or Sweden can hardly be used to convince the
sceptics. Whoever wants to argue for enlargement by presenting affirmative ma-
jorities cannot hide the equally strong groups of waverers. One heading from a
German newspaper perfectly illustrates the inherent dilemma: “One in two in
favour of EU enlargement” (Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 22, 2002). With an ap-
proval rate of 50%, it follows conclusively that every second person is likewise un-
decided or explicitly not in favour of enlargement.
Using the 2x2-matrix from above (figure 6) I will briefly discuss how the
Eurobarometer results could be capable of getting the political actors into trouble.
Countries in which both the citizens and the political elites have reservations to-
wards EU enlargement can obviously not be used to promote enlargement (cell 1).
These countries are themselves in a comparatively favourable situation, as there is a
national consensus over the fact that approval is only given if the national situation
does not deteriorate through enlargement. There is little interest in propagating the
approving majorities elsewhere. At the moment, France seems to be the only EU
member state in this constellation.
Sceptical elites with an affirmative population must be hesitant about drawing
attention to the public opinion in their country (cell 2) because then their particular
strategy would quite likely become the focus of international criticism: Why, for ex-
ample, does the Spanish government act reservedly while the Spanish people are
definitely in favour of enlargement? At the same time, sceptical elites cannot at-
tempt to reverse the positive mood among their citizenry. With an atmosphere in
Europe that is basically pro-enlargement there is no way of starting a publicity cam-
paign against it.
The political elites who explicitly support Eastern enlargement can encounter
some difficulties with the population majorities that are sceptical towards this issue
(cell 3). Public opinion in such countries is neither a good advertisement in favour
of enlargement nor suitable evidence that politicians are acting in accordance with
the preferences of the people. Every citizen could conclude from the distribution of
enlargement sceptics and advocates that political elites are acting against the will of
the majority. At the same time, political actors would have to ask themselves why
they are pushing enlargement forward in opposition to the majority in their coun-
try. Making references to majorities elsewhere would not solve the problem. On the
contrary, this could give rise to defiance and opposition among sceptical and unde-
cided citizens and could in general sharpen the awareness of the sceptics’ motives.
Finally, countries where elites and people both show approval for enlargement
are politically best off (cell 4). But, as Greece and Portugal demonstrate, the road to
enlargement is primarily a strategic game. Whoever for the good of the whole argues
with the overwhelming pro-enlargement majorities in their own country runs the
risk of having the other EU partners take this for a willingness to pay the costs. For
tactical reasons Greece and Portugal, and also other member states, may come to
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the point where they link their political support to nationally oriented conditions,
put forward a package deal, and finally come to act with reserve towards enlarge-
ment.
Eastern enlargement as the project of elites
These developments might not be very likely, but the thread of the arguments should
give rise to a substantial discussion of credible political strategies. In the light of this
constellation of problems, the limited reaction of politicians to the survey results is
not surprising. Instead of promoting the currently established affirmative majorities
from country to country, political actors are banking on getting more information
about accession in order to increase support and think it especially important to
clearly explain the enlargement process to the citizens of the EU and the accession
countries [Verheugen n.d.: 26]. But information campaigns bind the rhetoric of iden-
tity to rational cost-benefit analysis. The more financial questions come to the core
of the negotiations, the more clearly the burden expected from enlargement is put in
figures, and the more important the reference to national advantages seems to be, the
more the importance of cost-benefit-analysis will exceed the effect of political
rhetoric. As long as the EU tries to keep negotiations with candidate countries be-
hind closed doors, as long as enlargement remains the task of some diplomats and
civil servants in Brussels, and as long as high-rank member state officials only meet
to defend national priorities [Höltschi 2001], the credibility of enlargement rhetoric
will remain under pressure and the readiness for redistribution is likely to go down.
The rhetoric of collective identity may be understood as nothing more than rhetoric,
and it may be put aside while calculating benefits will prevail. 
Appealing to the idea of a European family can hardly conceal solid conflicts
of interest. Particularly the financial controversies among the EU member states and
between EU and candidate countries tend to leak out despite the closed doors, and
they are capable of undermining the political rhetoric primarily for two reasons:
First, the running conflicts over the distribution of enlargement burdens between
the Northern European net payers and the Southern European net beneficiaries are
a visible contradiction to the call for a growing community of all Europeans. So far
the problem of financial burden-sharing that arose during each of the previous en-
largement rounds was solved simply by increasing the existing funds or inventing
new funds in order to obtain approval from those member states that were likely to
experience disadvantages through enlargement [Emmerling n.d.]. This is not a vi-
able solution today because the member states cannot see sufficient financial op-
tions open to increase the budget in order to compensate anybody for losses. Thus,
bargaining for national advantages forces its way to the surface again and again dur-
ing the European summits and the Council of Ministers negotiations.7
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7 The compromise recently found between France and Germany concerning Common Agri-
cultural Policy does not really break with this logic. The deal only postponed the argument
Second, the negotiations between the European Union and the candidate
states show that EU political elites tend to measure with two yardsticks when as-
sessing situations. The acquis communautaire requires East European countries to
achieve standards which in some cases, like the treatment of refugees and minori-
ties or ecological requirements, even some EU member states do not yet fulfil. In de-
veloping the common market the EU is eager to ensure that the market access of the
new members does not worsen the conditions for the old member states. This atti-
tude must create an impression among the candidate countries that they are being
fleeced until they also become members of the European Union. Consequently,
polls in the candidate countries have shown sinking enthusiasm for accession, and
the wariness about Europe is spreading. Public opinion polls in Latvia, Estonia and
Malta resulted in less than 50% of the polled saying they would vote for EU mem-
bership in a coming referendum [European Commission 2002c: 57].8 The strategies
the political elites adopt to safeguard national or EU interests at the expense of oth-
ers do not serve to strengthen public support for enlargement, and consequently
nor do they serve the development of a sustainable European identity.
Conclusion
In this article I have attempted to provide stimulus to the discussion of the meaning
and relevance of collective identity in the process of European integration. I tried to
draw some attention to the fact that national and EU politicians are still pursuing
enlargement as a project of the elites. Although there is a significant share of en-
largement advocates among European citizens, the European Commission’s survey
results can hardly be adopted as a means to integrate all of Europe’s public in the
enlargement process. It seems too difficult to isolate the approval amidst the variety
of public opinions and thereby use it to enhance the enlargement process. Conse-
quently, political elites do not pay sufficient attention to the high level of consent
that exists in some countries and do not use these favourable attitudes to the bene-
fit of Europe’s common future. Instead, they rely on a mixture of rhetoric about
identity and rational cost-benefit calculations. 
Although my findings are preliminary and need further examination, there is
some evidence that European identity, as perceived in the Eurobarometer, is not suf-
ficient as a reliable basis for Europe’s future development. Instead, the orientation
towards national interests may triumph over the feeling of European identity. This,
of course, does not mean that Eastern enlargement of the European Union is
doomed to fail. However, it does follow that political elites in their reference to a col-
lective European identity and disengagement from public opinion undermine pub-
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about the distribution of financial burdens and is rather an agreement not to prevent the suc-
cessful conclusion of the accession talks than a solution to CAP problems.
8 In spite of these unfavourable tendencies in all the candidate countries the majority citizens
could be convinced to vote for accession in the national referenda.
lic support for enlargement. Politicians may as a result seriously endanger an en-
largement process that needs extraordinary public approval, and worsen the
chances for the development of collective identity in Europe, which are not too good
anyway.
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